You are currently viewing the United States website Institutional website. You can change your location here or visit other RBC GAM websites.

Welcome to the RBC Global Asset Management site for Institutional Investors

In order to proceed to the site, please accept our Terms & Conditions.

This RBC Global Asset Management (U.S.) Website is intended for institutional investors only.

For purposes of this Website, the term "Institutional" includes but is not limited to sophisticated non-retail investors such as investment companies, banks, insurance companies, investment advisers, plan sponsors, endowments, government entities, high net worth individuals and those acting on behalf of institutional investors. The Website contains information, material and content about RBC Global Asset Management (collectively, the “Information”).

The Website and the Information are provided for information purposes only and do not constitute an offer, solicitation or invitation to buy or sell a security, any other product or service, or to participate in any particular trading strategy. The Website and the Information are not directed at or intended for use by any person resident or located in any jurisdiction where (1) the distribution of such information or functionality is contrary to the laws of such jurisdiction or (2) such distribution is prohibited without obtaining the necessary licenses and such authorizations have not been obtained. Investment strategies may not be eligible for sale or available to residents of certain countries or certain categories of investors.

The Information is provided without regard to the specific investment objectives, financial situation or particular needs of any specific recipient and does not constitute investment, tax, accounting or legal advice. Recipients are strongly advised to make an independent review with an investment professional and reach their own conclusions regarding the investment merits and risks, legal, credit, tax and accounting aspects of any transactions.

Accept Decline
8 minutes to read by  BlueBay Fixed Income teamP.Kurdyavko, CFA Sep 6, 2024

Key Points

  • The characteristics of China’s post-Covid crisis

  • The government’s plan for economic recovery versus prevailing sentiment on the ground

  • The structural challenges hindering an economic rebound

  • Reasons for longer-term optimism

bikes.jpg

Have you ever lived through a crisis? Most of us have had a crisis experience either personally or professionally. In August 1998 I was, at my mother’s request, stocking up on toothpaste and toilet paper in a supermarket in New York before flying back to Russia after the country defaulted on its debt. While a crisis experience can be frightening at times, this can also be accompanied by a sense of hope that it will be short lived, with optimism that policy makers will find a solution to engineer a prompt recovery. Private entrepreneurs can also play a big role, often stepping in to take advantage of opportunities following the crisis. From a return perspective, these opportunities tend to present amongst the best IRRs for investors. Yet in China a crisis seems to have different characteristics. I flew over to China this summer to spend a few days on the ground visiting several provinces, meeting local and central government officials as well as companies’ management and private entrepreneurs to get a better sense of a path towards recovery.

Following the trip, we remain underweight China’s Hard Currency debt in both corporate and sovereign funds given relatively tight valuations.  We have a neutral view on Local Currency debt. Unlikely other countries, we feel that a post-crisis China has not presented investors with an opportunity to generate attractive returns. Here is why. 

China’s central government has to some extent self-engineered a crisis in the real estate sector by imposing several measures to tackle corruption and accumulation of leverage. The introduction of  ‘three red lines’ alongside  an anti-corruption campaign was designed to remove excesses from the economy in a controlled manner. Based on my observations, crisis management and the path for recovery in China differ from that of other market economies. Select macro data, such as GDP growth or export statistics, indicate a steady recovery. The country is also seeing a positive trend in other sectors of the economy that are being prioritized by the government.  Yet these numbers are at a sharp contrast with local sentiment and weak consumer demand. What is the cost of a proactive crisis management? Can one be as effective in engineering a recovery, as well as a downturn?

The Chinese government has presented a well-articulated plan for economic recovery. The party line to us from the policy makers is clear - the decline in the real estate sector, that translated into 3.7% drag on GDP growth, was more than offset by a pick-up in high tech, green and digital sectors that that contributed 5.7% to the GDP growth this year¹.  This includes certain sectors, like solar panels and lithium battery production, where exports are growing at rates well above 20% y/y². However, this narrative does not appear to reflect the sentiment on the ground. 

Firstly, this is due to the fact that in certain sectors export recovery is delivered at the expense of cost and margin reduction.  A large number of state employees have received salary cuts to keep costs under control. Moreover, compared to private enterprises, state owned firms are able to withstand more margin pressure in order to deliver targets set by the government. China manufactures 30% of the world’s goods but China’s population is 20% of the world³.

Therefore, maintaining a healthy export growth is a key policy objective. This partially explains why Chinese export volumes to EU and US destinations continue to grow despite growing export tariffs. Given export growth remains government priority, we do not expect an aggressive response to further tariff hikes from China.  either through a sharp currency devaluation (that would damage CNY longer term path towards a reserve currency) or through counter measures that could result in product shortages. 

Secondly, the pace of the recovery is also affected by the negative sentiment within the private sector. Foreign players might be less affected by cost cuts and margin pressure, but they are still feeling the growing burden of bureaucracy. Anecdotally, some companies are voicing concerns that the volume of regulatory breaches has increased over the last few years, despite continuous engagement with the government to lower the numbers. Some local private players also express the concern over a growing burden of bureaucracy. One local entrepreneur with interests in manufacturing and real estate summarized the new approach of policy makers when it comes to engagement with business owners as follows: “The less you do the fewer mistakes you make”. It isn’t surprising, therefore, that privately owned companies are also failing to provide stimulus for a faster economic recovery.

Thirdly, the level of mistrust between the local and central government leads to the latter being reluctant to channel more funds to the former to partially offset the reduction of revenues from land sales in the troubled real estate sector. The mistrust stems from a perception of mismanagement of generous funding received by the local government in the pre-COVID period. As a result, the central government is focusing either on supply driven incentives to stimulate the Real Estate sector by reducing borrowing rates and increasing lending facilities to the developers on the white list, or on demand driven incentives by reducing down-payments and improving mortgage availability. The problem, however, is that these measures are simply not enough to engineer a robust recovery.

There are also some structural challenges to maneuvring a quicker rebound in China. One of them relates to overcapacity in certain sectors and lack of consolidation. For example, instead of 10 larger private players producing electric vehicles, China has over 200 companies in the sector, which leads to price wars and margin erosion. Another challenge relates to demographics, but goes beyond the aging population and rather focuses on the differences in cognitive skills of students in rural areas versus the cities.  Based on the study published by Scott Rozelle from Stanford University students in rural areas with the same level of educational facilities and nutrition show much lower results in Nationwide Tests than their counterparts who grew up in the city. The difference seems to be driven by the lack of mental stimulation of rural children in earlier years of their development that negatively contributes to their cognitive skills and ability to learn later in life.

Finally, continued global geopolitical tensions are also creating a sentiment of mistrust between China and the West that negatively weighs on the sentiment both within China and between China and its trade partners.

To receive the latest Polina's Perspective subscribe.

What gives us room for longer term optimism? A number of key factors: firstly, for better or for worse, the work ethic in China is the strongest amongst any other country that I have visited in Emerging Markets. For example, some senior government officials only have five days of holidays a year and are accustomed to working long hours and six-day weeks away from home. Separately, we are encouraged by the market understanding and economic vision of several members of politburo like Yuan Jiajun (party secretary of Chong Qing) and Chen Jining (party secretary of Shanghai) but, in our view, the transition is likely to be at least five years away. In the meantime we would expect a continuation of the current slow pace of Chinese recovery. With that said, it is important to acknowledge that even at a slower pace of growth China is still generating an annual increase in GDP equivalent to the size of total the total GDP growth of the European Union and, hence, remains a global force to be reckoned with. 

Often when countries go through crises, while economic hardships are unavoidable, investors tend to find ways to benefit from the recovery story and, consequently, partially contribute to a faster path towards normalization. China’s proactive crisis management that was exemplary, especially at the outset of COVID, also created a different path towards recovery that offers investors less optimism with respect to generating strong returns in the near future. Having said this, whilst recovery with Chinese characteristics is likely to take longer than investors might have patience for, it is equally unlikely to cause high asset price volatility either within or outside of China.

goods.jpg

¹ ² Ministry of Finance.

³ China accounts for 30% of global manufacturing output (scio.gov.cn), China population (worldometers.info)

Déclarations

Ce document est fourni par RBC Gestion mondiale d’actifs (RBC GMA) à titre indicatif seulement. Il ne peut être ni reproduit, ni distribué, ni publié sans le consentement écrit préalable de RBC GMA ou de ses entités affiliées mentionnées dans les présentes. RBC GMA est la division de gestion d’actifs de Banque Royale du Canada (RBC) qui regroupe RBC Gestion mondiale d’actifs Inc. (RBC GMA Inc.), RBC Global Asset Management (U.S.) Inc. (RBC GAM (US)), RBC Global Asset Management (UK) Limited (RBC GAM (UK)) et RBC Global Asset Management (Asia) Limited (RBC GAM (Asia)), qui sont des filiales distinctes, mais affiliées de RBC.

Au Canada, le document peut être distribué par RBC GMA Inc. (y compris PH&N Institutionnel), qui est régie par chaque commission provinciale ou territoriale des valeurs mobilières auprès de laquelle elle est inscrite. Aux États-Unis (É.-U.), ce document peut être fourni par RBC GAM (U.S.), une société-conseil en placement inscrite auprès de la SEC. Le document est publié au Royaume-Uni (R.-U.) par RBC GAM-UK, qui est autorisée et régie par la Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) du Royaume-Uni, inscrite aux États-Unis auprès de la Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), et est membre de la National Futures Association (NFA) autorisé par la Commodities Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) des États-Unis. Ce document pet être distribué dans l’Espace économique européen (EEE) par BlueBay Funds Management Company S.A. (BBFM S.A.), qui est régie par la Commission de Surveillance du Secteur Financier (CSSF). En Allemagne, en Italie, en Espagne et aux Pays-Bas, BBFM S.A. exerce ses activités aux termes d’un mécanisme de passeport facilitant l’implantation de succursales en vertu de la Directive 2009/65/CE concernant certains organismes de placement collectif en valeurs mobilières et de la Directive 2011/61/UE sur les gestionnaires de fonds d’investissement alternatifs. En Suisse, ce document peut être distribué par BlueBay Asset Management AG, dont le représentant et l’agent payeur est BNP Paribas Securities Services, Paris, succursale de Zurich, Selnaustrasse 16, 8002 Zurich (Suisse). Au Japon, ce document peut être distribué par BlueBay Asset Management International Limited, qui est inscrite auprès du bureau local du ministère des Finances du Japon de la région de Kanto. Ailleurs, en Asie, ce document peut être distribué par RBC GAM (Asia), qui est inscrite auprès de la Securities and Futures Commission (SFC) de Hong Kong. En Australie, RBC GAM-UK est exemptée de l’obligation de s’inscrire à titre de cabinet de services financiers, conformément à la loi sur les sociétés se rapportant aux services financiers, puisqu’elle est régie par la FCA en vertu des lois du Royaume-Uni, lesquelles diffèrent des lois australiennes. Toutes les entités mentionnées ci-dessus relativement à la distribution sont collectivement incluses dans les références faites à « RBC GMA » dans ce document.

Ce document ne peut pas être distribué aux investisseurs résidant dans les territoires où une telle distribution est interdite.

Les inscriptions et les adhésions mentionnées ne doivent pas être interprétées comme une caution ou une approbation de RBC GMA par les autorités responsables de la délivrance des permis ou des inscriptions.

Ce document ne constitue pas une offre d’achat ou de vente ou la sollicitation d’achat ou de vente de titres, de produits ou de services, et ce, dans tous les territoires. Il n’a pas non plus pour objectif de fournir des conseils financiers, juridiques, comptables, fiscaux, liés aux placements ou autres, et ne doit pas servir de fondement à de tels conseils. Les produits, services ou placements mentionnés dans les présentes ne sont pas offerts dans tous les territoires, et certains le sont uniquement de manière limitée, selon les exigences réglementaires et légales locales. Vous trouverez des informations complémentaires sur RBC GMA sur le site Web www.rbcgam.com. Il est fortement recommandé aux personnes ou entités qui reçoivent ce document de consulter leurs propres conseillers et de tirer leurs propres conclusions sur les avantages et les risques de placement, de même que sur les aspects juridiques, fiscaux et comptables et ceux relatifs au crédit de l’ensemble des opérations.

Tout renseignement prospectif sur les placements ou l’économie contenu dans ce document a été obtenu par RBC GMA auprès de plusieurs sources. Les renseignements obtenus de tiers sont jugés fiables, mais ni RBC GMA, ni ses sociétés affiliées, ni aucune autre personne n’en garantissent explicitement ou implicitement l’exactitude, l’intégralité ou la pertinence. RBC GMA et ses sociétés affiliées n’assument aucune responsabilité à l’égard des erreurs ou des omissions relatives à ces renseignements. Les opinions contenues dans le présent document reflètent le jugement et le leadership éclairé de RBC GMA, et peuvent changer à tout moment sans préavis.

Certains énoncés contenus dans le présent document peuvent être considérés comme étant des énoncés prospectifs, lesquels expriment des attentes ou des prévisions actuelles à l’égard de résultats ou d’événements futurs. Les énoncés prospectifs ne sont pas des garanties de rendements ou d’événements futurs et comportent des risques et des incertitudes. Il convient de ne pas se fier indûment à ces énoncés, puisque les résultats ou les événements réels pourraient différer considérablement.

®/MC Marque(s) de commerce de Banque Royale du Canada, utilisée sous licence.
© RBC Gestion mondiale d’actifs Inc., 2026
document.addEventListener("DOMContentLoaded", function() { let wrapper = document.querySelector('div[data-location="inst-insight-article-additional-resources"]'); if (wrapper) { let liElements = wrapper.querySelectorAll('.link-card-item'); liElements.forEach(function(liElement) { liElement.classList.remove('col-xl-3'); liElement.classList.add('col-xl-4'); }); } }) .section-block .footnote:empty { display: none !important; } footer.section-block * { font-size: 0.75rem; line-height: 1.5; }