I wanted to update my thoughts on Ukraine, particularly around the duration and ultimate damage done by the conflict as this will be key to understanding the longerterm economic story in Ukraine - the rebuilding demands.
The first point here is that it’s clearly difficult to predict anything in a conflict. We have seen the ebb and flow of this war; beginning with Moscow’s apparent blitzkrieg and most peoples’ assumption that it would be all over in days with a Russian victory. We then saw a Ukrainian victory in the battle of Kyiv, followed by Russia refocusing on Donbas and victories in Severdonetsk and Lychachyansk. In recent weeks the momentum seems to be turning again through the provision of new Western military supplies (HIMARS) to Ukraine. Russian forces in Donbas have stalled and the focus is now turning to a looming battle for Kherson with Ukraine expected to go on the offensive.
Second point to consider is how much depends on Putin. Ultimately, the war will end when Putin decides to stop offensive actions - he might need to be beaten on the battlefield first though. Now, six months in, surely Putin must be questioning whether he really can win this war? If that is the case, maybe he will push for a nearer-term peace deal.
“The first point here is that it’s clearly difficult to predict anything in a conflict”.
I think what is now clear is that Russia does not have unlimited capacity to prolong this conflict unless, that is, Putin is prepared to put the Russian economy on a full scale, total war setting - think WW2 style general mobilisation and state planning of the economy. I guess you could refer back to Iraq under Saddam and say, “look, he waged the Iran war for close to a decade”. However, Saddam was being financed and armed by the Gulf and the US.
Russia currently has limited external sources of money or arms, albeit higher oil prices are helping, and this poses one of the main problems for Putin. By most accounts, Russia has lost a huge amount of kit and troops in this conflict - likely half its combat capability - and the kit is difficult to replace quickly. Russia is running out of supplies of highprecision missiles, and they are difficult to manufacture given Western technology export bans to Russia. So far, China has not been willing to help Russia - albeit that could change with the recent Pelosi visit.
On resupply, the HIMARS systems supplied to Ukraine are now having a devastating effect, wreaking havoc on Russian supply chains which were already vulnerable. If Russia cannot get sufficient kit to the front line, it cannot conduct war, simple as that. There is also the issue of troops and morale for Russia whereas Ukraine has said it can get 1 million troops into the field. Given its home advantage, and now Western training, manpower is not an issue for Ukraine, but it is for Russia.
Russian casualties are likely tens of thousands already - some suggest KIA and MIA might be as many as 100,000 which is half the number of troops that initially started this campaign. Unless Putin begins a general mobilisation, Russia can’t get that many troops into the field quickly. Plus, it could also be pointless task, if it cannot arm them anyway, given the resupply problems.
Indeed, we are now seeing Russian forces having to be moved from different fronts, first from the north to Donbas, now to the South. Meanwhile, for political reasons, Putin seems reluctant to go to a general mobilisation. He seems to be happy to use troops drawn from poorer southern, largely Muslim, regions but not risk casualties from Western Russia, Moscow, and St Petersburg, et al. It seems that Putin is nervous about the domestic political setting in Russia itself. The bottom line here is that Ukraine can mobilise close to 1 million men and women, who are motivated to fight for their land. Putin is already close to depleting Russian regular forces and do Russians really want to fight for someone else’s land?
Please read the full piece here.